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It comes as no surprise that events in recent 
years have given rise to many a debate about 
issues regarding the limitations and restrictions 
of the right to freedom of expression in the light 
of media freedom, considering the therewith 
associated consequences of fundamental human 
right violations. 
The right to freedom of expression has been 
established as a general principle by many 
international instruments, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in Article 19, the UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
in Article 19, and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which in Article 11 secures the status of the 
right to freedom of expression and information 
as a fundamental EU right with binding e!ect, 
according to which:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. 
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers.
2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be 
respected.” 
From this it is derived that the right to freedom 
of expression has a two-fold character. It provides 
the individual with the right to freely hold and 
express their opinion and impart information, 
whilst also equipping the press, in its traditional 
print and audiovisual but also online form, with the 
“guarantees appropriate to an institution inherent to 
the democratic process”1, and allows for the press to 
be established in the role of the “public watchdog”. 
1 Poptcheva, E., Press freedom in the EU – Legal frame-
work and challenges, European Parliamentary Research 
Service Brie"ng, April 2015.
This duality of its character implies that a violation 
of the right to freedom of expression a!ects not 
only the right of the individual but simultaneously 
harms society as a whole, as the right constitutes the 
necessary counterweigh to ensure the separation 
of powers2 by being utilised in their democratic 
control, with the media to this extent oftentimes 
being considered the Fourth Estate.
Media freedom, constituting a more advanced 
concept of “freedom of the press”, due to the 
rapid development of new platforms available 
for the mass distribution of information, a!ords 
freedom of expression and information its most 
powerful platform and contributes signi"cantly to 
the formation of public opinion3. Furthermore, it 
emerges as an important notion not only in relation 
to the democratisation of societies in general, but 
also of political institutions and rules in particular4, 
as a society is free only to the degree to which its 
citizens are informed and can participate in open 
discussions and public discourse5. This notion is 
further recognised by the European Charter on 
Freedom of the Press, which prescribes in Article 
1: “Freedom of the press is essential to a democratic 
2 Úbeda de Torres, A., Freedom of Expression under 
the European Convention on Human Rights: A Comparison 
With the Inter-American System of Protection of Human 
Rights, Human Rights Brief 10, no. 2 (2003), p. 7.
3 See Poptcheva, supra note 1.
4 Calderaro, A. and Dobreva, A., European Union 
Competences in Respect of Media Pluralism and Media 
Freedom, Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Free-
dom at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Stud-
ies, EUI, RSCAS PP 2013/01, (2003).
5 Barber, B., The Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philoso-
phy in Democratic Times, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, (1989).
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society. To uphold and protect it, and to respect its 
diversity and its political, social and cultural missions, 
is the mandate of all governments”.
However, it is Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights that, corresponding 
to Article 11 of the Charter, e!ectively reduces the 
national sovereignty and the scope of national 
limitations restricting the right to freedom of 
expression and information6, and allows the 
protection of media freedom through the 
enforcement machinery in which the European 
Court of Human Rights plays a crucial role7. Despite 
the ECtHR not being a body of the European Union, 
the Court of Justice of the EU gives the ECtHR 
“special signi"cance” in its case law, and has been 
interpreting EU legal provisions in the light of the 
Convention’s general principles long before the 
adherence to them became binding with Article 6 
TEU8. 
Yet, freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press are not established in the Convention as 
absolute rights. The Convention itself establishes 
a speci"c possible restriction in the form of a 
licensing regime for broadcasting, television and 
cinema enterprises in Article 10§1, and allows 
public authorities to further interfere with the right 
to freedom of expression by way of formalities, 
conditions and even penalties. Furthermore, 
through the case law of the ECtHR, it has been 
made abundantly clear that the prohibition, 
restriction or sanctioning of the use of the right 
to freedom of expression and the right to access 
or impart information by national law is only 
acceptable when the restriction is prescribed by 
a domestic law that is accessible, foreseeable and 
precise, is in pursuance of a legitimate aim laid 
out in Article 10§2 of the Convention9, and, most 
6 Voorhoof, D., The Right to Freedom of Expression and 
Information under the European Human Rights System: 
Towards a more Transparent Democratic Society, Centre 
for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, EUI, RSCAS 
2014/12, (2014).
7 Harris, D.J., O’Boyle, M., Bates, E.P. and Buckley, M.C., 
Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Oxford University Press, (2009). 
8 See Poptcheva, supra note 1.
9 Article 10§2 of the Convention reads: “The exercise 
of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and respon-
sibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of na-
importantly, is “necessary in a democratic society” 
for its attainment10. 
The Court has introduced two key notions 
assisting and guiding the States in their 
judgements of to be restricted speech by limiting 
the extent of a state’s power of restriction to being 
structurally dependent upon the contribution of 
the speech to a “general interest or public debate” 
and its character as a declaration of fact or a “value 
judgement”, with the latter being granted almost 
absolute protection, so long as the opinion put 
forward was made in good faith and is not devoid 
of any factual basis11.
The Court has, further, reiterated on many 
occasions that freedom of expression is applicable 
not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably 
received or regarded as ino!ensive or as a matter 
of indi!erence, but also to those that o!end, shock 
or disturb, as such are the demands of pluralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness without which 
there would be no “democratic society”12. As such, 
even polemic13 and sarcastic14 language is to be 
tolerated in light of the right to exaggeration and 
provocation as an inherent component of political 
discourse15, as an open, pluralistic and democratic 
society by itself is the most e!ective, if not the only, 
guarantor of respect for civil, political, cultural and 
social rights and freedoms16. Nevertheless, the 
Court did establish a system of boundaries to the 
tional security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of 
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received 
in con6dence, or for maintaining the authority and impar-
tiality of the judiciary.”
10 The Sunday Times v United Kingdom, no. 12166/87 
ECHR 1991.
11 Flauss, J., The European Court of Human Rights 
and the Freedom of Expression, Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 
84: Iss. 3, Article 3, p. 815, (2009); Brasilier v France, no. 
71343/01, ECHR 2006.
12 Del6 AS v Estonia, no. 64569/09, ECHR 2015; Steel 
and Morris v the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01 ECHR 
2005-II; Mouvement raëlien suisse v Switzerland, no. 
16354/06, ECHR 2012; Animal Defenders International v. 
the United Kingdom, no. 48876/08, ECHR 2013.
13 Lopes Gomes da Silva v Portugal, no. 37698/97, 
ECHR 2000-X.
14 Katrami v Greece, no. 19331/05, ECHR 2007.
15 See Flauss, supra note 11, p. 818.
16 See Voorhoof, supra note 6.
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manner of expression, with the language required 
to not be by its very nature illicit, solely aimed at 
sensationalism or leading to the gratuitous insult 
of others17.
Thus, regardless of the opinions expressed, any 
exceptions to the right of freedom of expression 
and information must be construed strictly and any 
restrictions established convincingly18. It is necessary 
to examine whether the reasons for restricting the 
rights of Article 10 of the Convention are su$cient 
and pertinent and the measures taken adequate 
by not being disproportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued. In this sense, the Contracting States 
have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing 
whether such a “pressing social need”, requiring 
authoritative protection, exists19. 
Yet, taking into consideration the eminent 
role of the press in aiding political discourse, an 
even broader level of protection of journalistic 
expression is to be granted in comparison to 
that of the average individual, in the form of inter 
alia heightened protection of the con"dentiality 
of journalistic sources and the reduction of the 
reach of journalistic duties, which are not to be 
restricted only to the traditional media but ought 
to also encompass individuals engaged in amateur 
journalistic activity within the scope of the new 
media20, as such are the demands of the very 
strict interpretation of restrictions to journalistic 
freedom of expression granted and demanded 
by the press’ contribution to democratic control. 
As a result, journalists cannot be summoned to 
divulge their sources and cannot be prosecuted for 
having revealed information transmitted to them 
regardless of its protection by law21, as “the right 
of journalists to not disclose their sources should not 
be considered as a simple privilege granted to them 
depending on the legality or illegality of their sources, 
but as an actual attribute of the right to information”22. 
Oftentimes, the freedom of journalistic expression 
reaches as far as to encompass the divulgence of 
17 See Flauss, supra note 11, p. 819; Klein v Slovakia, 
no. 72208/01 ECHR 2006; Stoll v Switzerland [GC], no. 
69698/01, ECHR 2007.
18 The Sunday Times v United Kingdom, no. 12166/87, 
ECHR 1991.
19 See Voorhoof, supra note 6.
20 See Flauss, supra note 11, p. 827.
21 See Flauss, supra note 11, p. 828.
22 Tillack v. Belgium, no. 20477/05, ECHR 2007.
government secrets, as “it enables the civil society 
to control the actions of the Government to which 
it has entrusted the protection of its interests”23. The 
Court has, furthermore, emphasised that it “must 
exercise caution when the measures taken or actions 
imposed by the national authorities are such as to 
dissuade the press from taking part in a discussion 
of matters of legitimate public concern […]. The 
chilling e8ect that the fear of criminal sanctions has 
on the exercise of journalistic freedom of expression is 
evident […]. This e8ect, which works to the detriment 
of society as a whole, is likewise a factor which goes to 
the proportionality, and thus the justi6cation, of the 
sanctions imposed on media professionals”24.
Nevertheless, even the exorbitant protection of 
journalistic expression "nds its limits in light of the 
values of the democratic society, with the restrictions 
of Article 10§2 of the Convention oftentimes being 
interpreted through the lens of Article 1725. To this 
end, the Court has decided upon the existence 
of certain clearly established “notorious historical 
truths”26 the historical revisionism or denial of which 
do not fall under the protection of Article 10, due 
to them constituting a substantial threat to public 
order27. Furthermore, language of intolerance or 
hate speech is also excluded from the protection 
of Article 10, with the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe de"ning hate speech as “all 
forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or 
justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or 
other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: 
intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and 
ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against 
minorities, migrants, and people of immigrant 
origin”28. Finally, the Court has established that 
23 See Flauss, supra note 11, p. 834; Claude-Reyes v 
Chile, No 151, Inter-AmCHR 2006.
24 Kaperzyński v Poland, no. 43206/07, ECHR 2012.
25 Article 17 of the Convention reads: “Nothing in 
this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity 
or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to 
a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.”
26 As such qualify: the Holocaust, Nazi prosecution 
of the Jews, the Nuremberg trials, and crimes against 
humanity committed during World War II.
27 See Flauss, supra note 11, p. 837; Garaudy v France, 
no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX.
28 Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe, 
Recommendation No. R (1997) 20 of the Committee 
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whilst direct or indirect incitement to violence does 
not lead to the ipso facto restriction of the right 
to freedom of expression, it grants the national 
authorities more extensive discretionary powers to 
implement limitations on the exercise of freedom 
of expression29.
Yet, freedom of expression is not the only 
fundamental right protected by the Convention, 
and as such is often to be weighed against 
concurrent or competing rights. In doing so the 
Court has recognised through its jurisdiction 
the right of ownership and the protection of 
religious convictions as concurrent rights enjoying 
strengthened enforceability30 in confrontations 
with the right to freedom of expression. And whilst 
the Court clearly recognises the precedence of 
the right of ownership over the right to freedom 
of expression,31 it uses two criteria to distinguish 
lawful from unlawful antireligious speech based 
on the need to protect the rights of others, by 
guaranteeing diversity of opinions and belief and 
preventing dissuasion of believers from expressing 
their beliefs and exercising their right to freedom 
of religion32. Emanating from these needs are 
an obligation to avoid gratuitously o!ensive 
expressions, which do not contribute to any form 
of public debate capable of furthering progress in 
human a!airs33, and the intolerance of injurious 
attacks made against sacred symbols or objects of 
religious veneration34. 
Furthermore, there are also certain concurrent 
rights, which enjoy limited enforceability. Such 
are considered to be the right to respect for one’s 
private life and the right to one’s reputation. The 
latter, whilst not expressly guaranteed in the 
Convention itself, is treated as a component of 
“protecting the rights of others”35, and as such 
of Ministers to Member States on “Hate Speech” 
(1997).
29 See Flauss, supra note 11, p. 841; Dogan v 
Turkey, (No. 3), no. 4119/02, ECHR 2006; Sürek v 
Turkey, no. 24762/94, ECHR 1999-IV; Zana v Turkey, 
no. 18954/91, ECHR 1997-VII.
30 See Flauss, supra note 11, p. 842.
31 Appleby v United Kingdom, no. 44306/98, 
ECHR 2003-VI.
32 See Flauss, supra note 11, p. 843.
33 Giniewski v France, no. 64016/00, ECHR 2006-I.
34 Tatlav v Turkey, no. 50692/99, ECHR 2006.
35 See Flauss, supra note 11, p. 845.
weighs systematically less when con&icting with 
the right to freedom of expression, as the right to 
one’s reputation is not “su;cient to outweigh the 
important public interest in the freedom of the press 
to impart information on matters of legitimate public 
concern”36. The right to privacy, on the other hand, 
can be restricted depending on the contribution 
the publication or message makes to a debate of 
general interest37. Should no such contribution exist, 
as is the case in the event of contentious remarks 
that relate strictly to the private life of a political 
"gure without any connection to their political 
mandate38, as information that strictly concerns 
the personal domain, precedence will be given to 
the right to privacy over the right to freedom of 
expression. However, especially in the case of the 
processing of personal data by persons engaging 
in the use of the right of freedom of journalistic 
expression as a profession, which constitutes the 
probably greatest tension between concurring 
rights, Article 9 of Directive 95/46/EC stipulates 
that Member States are to provide for exemptions 
or derogations from the provisions of the Directive 
for the processing of personal data which is solely 
being carried out for journalistic purposes to the 
extent that is necessary to reconcile the right 
to privacy with the rules governing freedom of 
expression,39 or in other words only to the extent 
they are “necessary for the purpose of balance 
between fundamental rights”40.
Overall, the right to freedom of expression is one 
of the most dynamic and multifaceted principles 
within the jurisdiction of the European Union and 
its Member States. Especially its emanation as 
journalistic freedom of expression demands special 
and broader protection, due to its in&uence on the 
formation of public opinion, its furthering of public 
discourse, and its promotion of democracy and its 
36 Tidende v Norway, no. 26132/95, ECHR 2000-
IV.
37 Von Hannover v Germany, no. 59320/00, ECHR 
2004-VI.
38 Tammer v Estonia, no. 41205/98, ECHR 
2001-I.
39 Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data.
40 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 37.
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values. As a result, it is the dynamic interpretation 
by the Court of what is to be considered “necessary 
in a democratic society” alongside the limitation of 
the “margin of appreciation” that has had a crucial 
e!ect on the impact of Article 10 of the Convention 
on the protection of media freedom in Europe, 
granting it overall a by far greater protection 
than most concurring rights. Regardless, certain 
limitations can be necessary for the protection 
of society as a whole, and whilst many national 
authorities, as demonstrated by the considerable 
amount of cases brought before the ECtHR, still do 
not meet the standards set forth in Article 10 of the 
Convention, it cannot be denied that important 
steps have been taken towards achieving the 
protection of media freedom in the EU, and thus 
driving towards a more transparent democratic 
society. 
